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One of the most striking features of the financial crisis that began in the autumn of 2007 has 
been the associated upheaval in conventional interest rate spreads. In the UK, this is most 
frequently symbolised by the widening (and increased volatility) of the spread between 3-
month Libor and the Bank of England’s policy rate. This paper uses a vector error correction 
model to look at the way in which the recent crisis has affected a wide range of interest rate 
spreads. We look for changes in the coefficient on the policy rate (the ‘pass-through’) and at 
changes in the speed of adjustment to changes in the policy rate, since both are important for 
policy. We find, as others have done, that the conventional behaviour of almost all spreads is 
swept away after August 2007. By developing a model which incorporates measures of 
counterparty and liquidity risk, we show that market rates are now subject to additional 
influences, but except for secured loans, still incorporate the effects of changes in the policy 
rate much as they did before the crisis. This contrasts with the widely-held view that the 
relationship between policy and money market rates in particular has been severely disrupted 
by the crisis.  For secured loans, however, there is evidence that the mark-up has risen while 
at the same time the policy pass-through has fallen since August 2007. The same applies to 
deposit rates, albeit to a lesser extent, with the result that the sharp reduction in policy rate 









JEL codes: E43, E52, E58 
 
Corresponding author: 
Prof. P G A Howells 
peter.howells@uwe.ac.uk 2 
 
Interest rate pass-through and risk 
 
Iris Biefang Frisancho-Mariscal and Peter Howells 
Centre for Global Finance 




One of the most striking features of the financial crisis that began in the autumn of 2007 has 
been the associated upheaval in conventional interest rate spreads. In the UK, this was most 
frequently symbolised by the widening of the spread between 3-month Libor and the Bank of 
England’s policy rate, since a very wide range of financial products were (and still are) priced 
by reference to 3-month Libor. In 2001, when we last looked at this issue (Biefang-Frisancho 
Mariscal and Howells 2002), 3-month Libor was around 20 basis points above the policy rate 
(in October 2001 Libor was actually below the policy rate). This differential persisted with 
very small variations until August 2007 when it increased to 70bp. In early 2008 the spread 
was around 80bp and in October it jumped to 150bp. Given that LIBOR is the basis for setting 
so many market rates, these jumps were ‘as if’ the central bank had increased the policy rate by 
50bp and then by another 100bp within the space of a month. Given the Bank of England’s 
preference for adjusting the policy rate by 25bp and spreading the changes over an extended 
period of time, these jumps in the spread were equivalent to inconceivably large policy 
shocks.
1 Since the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in most regimes relies upon 
changes in interest rates (ECB, 2004; Bank of England, 1999), that mechanism has been 
disrupted by recent events. 
  But there is more of interest here than what has happened to the level of short-term 
interest rates. What the episode brings home to us is a timely reminder that in economics it is 
relative prices that matter. While this piece of wisdom is driven home to every first year 
student it is, strangely, overlooked when it comes to macroeconomic policy discussions where 
it is the level rather than the structure of interest rates that often attracts attention. Yet it must 
be the case that the policymaker expects (or at least hopes) for a particular set of interest rate 
spreads from any policy change. In our earlier (2002) paper, for example, we pointed out that if 
the policymaker were concerned with the rate of growth of money and credit, then the desired 
outcome of an increase in the policy rate would be to raise loan rates by more than the increase 
in deposit rates (a widening of the loan-deposit spread). In the closing months of 2008 UK 
policymakers hoped that unprecedentedly large cuts in the policy rate would help to stimulate 
spending, through a reduction in the cost of credit, positive wealth effects, a fall in the 
exchange rate and other well-known channels. Looking at the cost of credit, however, a 
moment’s careful thought would tell us that the true cost is not the loan rate in isolation; rather 
it is the loan-deposit spread since the decision to borrow should depend upon the cost of the 
loan relative to the cost of drawing on existing liquid assets. And the loan-deposit spread 
actually widened recently when banks slashed savings rates, as can be seen at the very end of 
Figure 1. 
                                                 
1 Not quite ‘inconceivable’ since the Bank of England’s emergency 150bp cut in the policy rate on 4 December 
2008. 3 
 
  Furthermore, as we showed in our earlier (2002) paper, spreads will alter as the result 
of differential speeds of adjustment. Heffernan (1997), for example, showed that money market 
rates adjust more rapidly than the ‘administered’ rates of banks and building societies in 
response to a change in the policy rate. Hence, while these adjustments are taking place, there 
will be changes to spreads which may last for some time after the policy shock. 
 
Figure 1: SVR mortgage rate minus time deposit rate 
 
 
  For all these reasons it seems a worthwhile endeavour to examine what exactly has 
happened to a range of interest rate relationships in the current upheaval and to see the extent 
to which long-run relationships may have been disturbed. Partly for data reasons, our 
investigation spans the period from January 1997 which gives us a ten year period of 
‘normality’ with which to compare recent events.  
We start, in section II with a brief review of what we already know about interest 
behaviour. The empirical tests are detailed in section III where we use a conventional vector 
error correction model. The data are discussed in section IV while the analysis and results are 
in section V.  Our summary and conclusions are in section VI. 
 
 
II. Policy and market rates 
Given that it is market rates
2 (not the official rate itself) which affect agents’ behaviour, it is 
not surprising that the transmission of interest rate changes through the money markets and 
beyond has received quite a lot of empirical attention over the years. In the 1990s, for example, 
Dale (1993) and Dale and Haldane (1993) for the Bank of England looked at the effect of a 
change in official rates on market rates. The emphasis in the former was on the impact on 
                                                 
2 Since we are talking about a number of interest rates that can be aggregated into categories with similar names, a 
moment’s clarification of terminology may be useful. In the following discussion, we shall refer to the official rate 
of interest, set by the central bank, as the policy rate. ‘Market rates’ refers to all other rates, i.e. rates which are 
influenced in some way by private economic agents. Within this category we shall sometimes refer to ‘money 
market rates’ which are rates determined in markets for tradeable securities, such as bills and certificates , in 























































































market rates differentiated by maturity while the latter differentiated by type of instrument. In 
both cases the findings were that the impact on market rates was quite varied. For example, the 
effect decayed with term to maturity (short-term rates responded more than long rates) and also 
decayed as the instrument was priced more by administrative decision and less by a continuous 
market (so mortgage loan rates and deposit rates responded more sluggishly than commercial 
paper and bill rates). 
  Also in the 1990s, Shelagh Heffernan looked at the pricing of a range of bank products 
following anecdotal evidence of bank and building society failure to pass on interest rate cuts 
to loan customers. Heffernan (1993) showed that the retail banking market was one of complex 
imperfect competition with sluggish loan and deposit rate adjustment. Interestingly (in the light 
of current developments) this study used Libor to proxy the official rate. More recently (1997) 
she used an error correction approach to explore the short- and long-run responses of rates on a 
number of banking products to changes in the policy rate. The model was initially estimated 
for seven different retail bank products using data from four large clearing banks, a number of 
smaller banks and five large building societies, covering the period (at longest) May 1986-
January 1991. On average, adjustments of chequing accounts and mortgages were 37 per cent 
complete within a month, but much slower for personal loans.  The imperfect competition, 
noted in the 1993 paper was one reason for the slow response, reinforced by administrative 
costs.  
  Our own 2002 paper used a vector autoregressive error correction model to investigate 
the links between the policy rate and each of 3-month Libor, a bank deposit rate and a short-
bond rate. This showed that while a policy rate change was fully reflected in the other rates 
eventually (there were no lasting effects on relative rates) the speeds of adjustment varied 
substantially and some effects took a year to work themselves out. It also suggested that 
adjustments had become more rapid following the financial deregulation of the 1980s. 
What all these investigations show is that any change in the official rate takes time to 
work its full effect on some market rates and therefore that there is a period of ‘disequilibrium’ 
during which interest rate relativities are disturbed. 
  The recent upheavals themselves have spawned a number of studies. In one of these 
(IMF, 2008) the authors looked at the recent stress in bank funding markets in the UK, US and 
the eurozone. One of their hypotheses is that the dislocation between policy and interbank rates 
has caused more stress for UK and US banks because of their more marked recent structural 
shift in funding towards money market instruments as against traditional or ‘core’ deposits.  
Hence, much of their discussion focuses upon the relationship between money market rates and 
‘core deposit rate’ (rather than policy rate). The study begins in 1998 and until the summer of 
2007 findings are not very different from what one would expect from the earlier studies 
above. In the long-run, there is a close relationship between policy rate and money market 
rates, although adjustment time varies with instrument. The linkage is loosest (and adjustment 
longest) for bank-administered borrower financing (e.g. mortgage) rates. The linkage is 
weakest for high yield corporate bonds. From the summer of 2007, however, there is a big 
increase in money market spreads and in forecast errors. The disruption appears to be greatest 
for the USA. The paper goes on to discuss the causes of high interbank spreads (and their 
variances) in the recent period and finds that this is largely due to systemic distress risk. This 5 
 
analysis of the causes of widening spreads leads the authors to the conclusion that the 
effectiveness of the rate of interest as policy instrument has been substantially damaged. 
 
...from mid-2007 the forecast errors for the three-month Libor jumped substantially at the 
same time as the extraordinary increase in money market spreads and the collapse of the 
structured credit market in response to subprime mortgage market distress ... The larger 
forecast errors for the near-bank financing rates (ABS and U.S. agency MBS yields) and a 
widening of forecast confidence intervals after the summer of 2007 is evidence of a 
dramatic alteration in the predictability of interest rate transmission. These results suggest 
that the early linkages of interest rate transmission in the United States have been impeded 
by the financial turmoil. (IMF, 2008, p.95) 
 
This view of the policy implications of the crisis has wide popular support. References to the 
need for alternative or additional policy instruments have littered the financial press since mid-
1980. But, the IMF is not alone amongst serious investigations in drawing this conclusion (see 
for example, also Rogers, 2009) 
  Another group of studies focuses on the ‘pass-through’, that is, on the way in which a 
change in the official rate is ‘passed through’ ultimately to a range of market rates. Typical of 
these is a recent investigation by de Bondt (2005) who estimates a two-stage model in which 
the bank loan rate is set as a mark up on the marginal cost of funds averaged across the 
eurozone. The policy rate is proxied by EONIA and different market rates are selected as 
representing the relevant marginal cost of funds for the rates on various bank products on the 
basis of their correlation with the product in question. The findings, briefly, were that the pass- 
through from the official rate to market rates at the short end of the yield curve (less than three 
months) was virtually complete and instantaneous. The pass-through from market rates to bank 
products, however, is much slower – typically about 50 per cent complete after a month for 
loans. But deposit rates are very sticky, having adjusted by only 40 per cent even after three 
months. The de Bondt study, of course pre-dates the recent upheavals and is mainly concerned 
with the effect on pass-through of the earlier movement to a single currency. He finds that the 
effects are more rapid since 1999. This conclusion is drawn by comparing the results with a 
substantial number of earlier, single country, studies (summarised in de Bondt on pp.41-2).  
More recently, we have seen the emergence of a literature which tries to identify the 
role of credit and liquidity risk in the recent upheavals in market (usually Libor) rates.  This 
literature includes Bank (2007), Taylor and Williams (2008), ECB (2008), Michaud and Upper 
(2008), Segoviano (2008), Segoviano and Goodhart (2008) and Button, Pezzini and Rossiter 
(2010) amongst others. We draw upon some of this work as we explain in section IV. 
 
III. Methodology 
We are here concerned with the relationship between the policy rate and a selection of market 
rates from January 1997 until July 2010 for the UK. Within this period, there are two distinct 
sub-periods, namely a period of ‘normality’ from January 1997 to July 2007 (hereafter, the 
‘earlier period’) and secondly the period since August 2007 to the present (hereafter the ‘later 
period’)
3. In order to compare the differences in the pass-through during these two periods, we 
                                                 
3 The later period consists of crisis and post-crisis period.  6 
 
first estimate a conventional two-dimensional vector error correction model (VECM) over the 
sample period before August 2007 and then over the entire period from January 1997 until July 
2010. For the entire period, the VECM will be slightly modified to account for the change in 
banks’ risk perception during the financial crisis.
 4 We first turn to the earlier period, for which 
the two-dimensional VECM is defined as:  
 
  
        =   +         −        −       −    +         (1) 
 
with   and   standing for any of the market rates and the policy rate, respectively. This model 
estimates β as the long-run pass-through in response to a policy rate change, the speed of 
adjustment to equilibrium, γ, and the average mark-up α over the policy rate or, more precisely, 
the percentage point difference between the market and the policy rate.
5  An estimated value of 
the slope parameter β equal to one would indicate a complete pass-through of the policy rate to 
the market rate in the long-run. Values of β below unity would indicate less than complete 
pass-through in the long-run, while an estimated slope parameter of greater than one, although 
statistically possible, is difficult to interpret economically. It would suggest that the market rate 
responds by more than the official rate in the long-run. Overshooting has a sensible economic 
interpretation in the short-run, since agents believe that more policy rate changes may be on 
their way, particularly when central banks smooth interest rates, but it generally cannot be 
justified economically in the long-run.  
Empirical studies (as summarized in section II) which covered various geographical 
areas and estimation methods, conducted before the financial crisis, concluded that even when 
there is sluggishness in the adjustment of administered rates and the long-run pass-through is 
incomplete, the relationship between market and policy rates was stable. Market rates broadly 
followed movements in the policy rate. The financial crisis led to massive write-downs and 
losses by (UK) banks, which in turn put substantial pressure on banks’ solvency ratios and 
gave rise to a general loss of confidence in the banking sector and, importantly, also among 
banks themselves. One of the consequences was the disruption of the functioning of the money 
markets which was reflected in the persistent widening of the spread between Libor and 
overnight index swap (OIS) rates. As many bank loan and deposit rates are based on money 
market rates, the disruption of the normally close relationship between Libor and OIS rates 
potentially impaired the transmission of monetary policy rate changes and market rates. 
Following the literature of recent models of arbitrage-free pricing, Taylor and Williams (2009)   
show that the spread between Libor and OIS measures liquidity constraints and counterparty 
risk premia. Libor measures the interest rate on unsecured loans and is a function of 
expectations of average future overnight rates and risk factors over the term. The overnight 
                                                 
4 Error correction models are conventionally used to estimate the pass-through (IMF, 2008 for US and European 
interest rate pass-through; Hofmann and Mizen , 2004 for UK banks; Sorensen and Werner, 2006 using panel unit 
root and cointegration tests; ECB, 2009) 
5 In relation to bank rates, the mark-up α can be interpreted as representing a host of factors (apart from the policy 
rate) such as bank efficiency, credit risk, market structure, degree of risk aversion, interest rate risk etc. Studies 




index swap (OIS) measures the average expected overnight interest rates and involves little 
counterparty risk since no money is exchanged until maturity. 
6 There is interest rate risk 
concerning the future path on interest rates. Since OIS is the average of the overnight interest 
rates expected until maturity, subtracting OIS from Libor removes interest rate expectations.  
Thus the spread between Libor and OIS measures liquidity and counterparty risks and it is 
considered as an indicator of the health of banks (Thornton, 2009).  
Liquidity risk can be measured as the spread between term-Libor and the term-
certificates of deposit (CD) rates (Taylor and Williams, 2009). The CD market is the market 
where non-banks lend to banks. As long as lenders are not liquidity constrained, banks can use 
the CD market to obtain liquidity. If the CD market is liquid, competition for funds will lead to 
similar rates on both, Libor and CD markets, provided that borrowers are of the same credit 
quality. Vice versa, if there is no liquidity in the market for CDs, the interest rate is unaffected 
and the spread between Libor and CD rate widens since competition for funds concentrates on 
the Libor market. The graph A2 in the appendix shows 3-month CD and corresponding Libor 
rates. Both rates are moving very closely together suggesting no liquidity constraints (see also 
Michaud and Upper (2008), Taylor and Williams (2009), Thornton (2009)). Consequently, the 
Libor-OIS spread will also be interpreted as a measure of counterparty risk. 
In order to test for robustness of results for the later period, we use an additional spread 
that measures counterparty risk. The Libor-Repo spread is the spread between unsecured and 
secured lending on the interbank market. Repurchase agreements are backed by government 
bonds and thus are a form of secured lending. The greater the risk of non-payment of a loan, 
the greater is ceteris paribus, the spread between unsecured (Libor) and secured lending (repo).  
In view of this discussion, equation (1) is modified to incorporate the change in the risk 
environment during the crisis period as: 
 
        =   +         +         −        −       −       −    +         (2) 
 
where    is either a measure of the Libor-OIS or the Libor-Repo spread.  
Since the issue of the paper is to compare interest rate pass-through during the normal 
and the crisis periods, the dynamic equation corresponding to (2) is slightly modified to 
incorporate potential differences in instant pass-through and changes in volatility: 
 
    =   +       +        −        +           +           +           +  
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  +      
         (3) 
 
Here      denotes the deviation from the long-run equilibrium in the previous period (the error 
correction term) based on equation (2). D is a dummy variable which is equal to one in the pre-
crisis period and zero otherwise. The difference of the coefficients     −      measures the 
difference in short-run immediate pass-through in the later period compared to the pre-crisis 
period. The aim is to find out whether banks delayed policy rate changes pass-through during 
the crisis relative to the normal period. During the crisis, policy rate fell and banks may have 
                                                 
6 The OIS rate is the rate on a derivative contract on the overnight rate (SONIA in the UK). In this contract, two 
parties agree that one will pay the other a rate of interest that is the difference between the OIS rate and the 
geometric average of the overnight rate. 8 
 
passed-through the policy rate fall more sluggishly to lending rates, for example, in order to 
mitigate losses incurred during the crisis. We include the dummy variable only in the equations 
for retail interest rates. The GARCH(1,1) model was estimated to account for changes in 
volatility over the sample period 1997 to 2010 which was significantly higher during the crisis 
and to obtain more accurate measures of the estimated covariance matrix.  
 
IV Data 
We use a wide selection of interest rates at a monthly frequency over the period from January 
1997 until July 2010. Our sample thus covers two distinct periods, the ‘normal’ and crisis 
period. The interest rates have been selected to represent a wide range of lending/borrowing 
behaviour ranging from household overdraft, mortgage and deposit rates as well as long-term 
government and corporate finance. Because of its importance in the setting of other rates we 
have also included 3-month Libor and various other money market rates to compare their 
behaviour over the crisis. The precise list of rates and the source of the data is given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Selected interest rates and sources 
Jan 1997 until July 2010 
Variable  Code/Source¹  Abbreviation 
Policy rate (2- week repo)   IUMAGR2W  pol 
SONIA  IUMASOIA  Sonia 
1-week Libor  IUMAVKA  LIBOR1W 
1-month Libor  IUMAVNEA  LIBOR1M 
3-month Libor   IUMAAMIJ  LIBOR3M 
6-month Libor  IUMAVSMA  LIBOR6M 
1-year Libor  IUMAVYRA  LIBOR1Y 
3-month CD rate  IUMAVCDA  CD3M 
Household sight deposit  IUMTHAK  Access 
Household time deposit  IUMWTTA  TD 
Household fixed rate bond  IUMWTFA  Hbond 
5-yr government bond yield  IUMASNZC  Gov5 
Corporate bond yield (long term)  Datastream – UKMCRPB(IR)  corpbond 
Fixed 2-year mortgage 75% LVT  IUMBV34  Mortg2Y 
Fixed 3-year mortgage 75% LVT  IUMBV37  Mortg3Y 
Fixed 5-year mortgage 75% LVT  IUMBV42  Mortg5Y 
2-year discounted mortgage  IUMBV48  Dismortg 
Standard variable rate mortgage   IUMTLMV  SVmortg 
Household overdraft  - IUMODTL  Overdr 
£5,000 unsecured household loan  IUMBX67  Loan5Y 
£10,000 unsecured household loan  IUMHPTL  Loan10Y 
Repo 3-months  IUMAGR3M  Repo3 
Overnight Index Swap  GBP3MOIS.ICAP.Reuters  OIS 
Notes: ¹ All data are from Bank of England interactive database, unless stated otherwise.  Loan5Y starts only from January 
2005 and OIS starts from July 2000. 
 
  The policy rate, set by the monetary policy committee, changes in steps and 
infrequently. For this reason we have chosen to proxy the policy rate by using 2-week gilt repo 
rate (pol). This is because the Bank of England’s money market operations have involved the 
use of 2-week gilt repo deals for most of the period.
7  
 
V. Empirical Analysis 
                                                 
7  Seven day repos since May 2006 9 
 
Figures A1 to A14 (A1a to A14a) show the time series of and the spreads between the interest 
rates and the policy rate. All money market rates and most retail rates (except those for 
unsecured loans) move closely together with the policy rate in the period before the crisis. At 
the very short end of the yield curve, money market rates continue to follow the policy rate 
during the crisis, but this changes when maturity is beyond one month. Bond yields and retail 
rates have diverted persistently from the policy rate since the crisis.  
Before testing for cointegration, variables are tested for stationarity.
8 Conventional unit 
root tests found that interest rates are integrated of order one.
9 Table 2 shows the results of the 
cointegration tests between the various market rates and the policy rate. In the pre-crisis period 
we find cointegration between all interest rates except for yields on household bonds,
10 interest 
rates on discounted mortgages and unsecured loans. An explanation for the detachment of loan 
from policy rates is given by the Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) model. Accordingly, loan rates may be 
subject to the phenomenon of endogenous default. The Stiglitz-Weiss model predicts that 
raising loan rates will increase default so that loan rates will never exceed an ‘efficiency’ 
interest rate at which net income from loan rates will be maximised. Consequently, banks will 
decide carefully whether to raise loan rates in response to increases in the policy rate because 
of the increased probability of default and the ensuing loss of profitability. Similarly, banks 
may not reduce loan rates in response to a reduction in the policy rate, because profits will fall 
while the probability of default will decrease. The loss of profit in case of default may be 
greater for unsecured than for secured loans since there is no collateral which may compensate 
for at least part of the potential default and thus unsecured loan rates may be even more 
detached from the policy rate than secured loans. 
When testing over the entire period, cointegration ceases for all rates, except for those 
at the very short end of the yield curve (such as Sonia and one-week Libor) and the 5-year 
















                                                 
8 By definition, bounded variables should be stationary. However, within a sample, they can appear as non-
stationary either due to weak mean reversion or to the low power of unit root tests (Hofmann and Mizen, 2004). 
9 Augmented Dickey Fuller tests were applied for both periods, pre-crisis and entire period. The test results can be 
obtained from the author upon request. 
10 Household bonds are fixed-interest, fixed-term deposits for maturities in excess of one year. 10 
 
Table 2: Cointegration tests of vectors consisting of a market/bank rate and the policy rate.* 
Vector  January 1997 to July 2007  January 1997 to July 2010 
  lag  Trace  Max  
eigenvalue 
CV  lag  Trace  Max  
eigenvalue 
CV 
  Money market rates 
Sonia  2  31.63***[0.000]  27.68***[0.000]  Y  2  20.00**[0.050]  17.66**[0.031]  Y 
LIBOR1W  2  21.506**[0.033]  17.851**[0.024]  Y  2  25.46***[0.009]  22.62**[0.004]  Y 
LIBOR1M  2  20.385**[0.048]  16.976**[0.034]  Y  2  18.919*[0.076]  15.92**[0.05]  Y 
LIBOR3M  2  22.123**[0.027]  18.936**[0.016]  Y  1  14.72[0.240]  12.625[0.152]  N 
LIBOR6M  2  21.616**[0.032]  18.474**[0.019]  Y  1  12.442[0.410]  10.699[0.275]  N 
LIBOR1Y  2  21.182**[0.037]  18.153**[0.022]  Y  1  15.576[0.195]  13.877[0.101]  N 
CD3M  2  22.437**[0.025]  19.302**[0.014]  Y  1  14.33[0.27]  12.25[0.17]  N 
  Deposit rates 
Access  5  17.108[0.129]  11.485[0.218]  N  5  12.647[0.393]  9.776[0.355]  N 
TD  6  29.723***[0.001]  24.70***[0.001]  Y  1  12.15[0.14]  9.29[0.40]  N 
Hbond  1  15.618[0.193]  12.250[0.172]  N  3  12.900[0.372]  10.100[0.325]  N 
  Yields 
Govb5  1  20.26***[0.010]  22.78***[0.000]  Y  1  21.26**[0.03]  19.29***[0.01]  Y 
Corpbond  2  19.428*[0.065]  15.1998*[0.064]  Y  3  17.376[0.119]  14.280*[0.08]  Y/N 
Secured loan 
Mortg2Y  1  17.921*[0.102]  15.062*[0.067]  Y  1  12.093[0.441]  10.362[0.303]  N 
Mortg3Y  1  23.603**[0.017]  19.169**[0.015]  Y  1  16.306[0.160]  13.832[0.103]  N 
Mortg5Y  1  21.834**[0.030]  16.791**[0.036]  Y  1  14.771[0.240]  12.425[0.163]  N 
DisMortg  2  18.172*[0.095]  11.877[0.193]  Y  3  12.572[0.399]  11.182[0.239]  N 
SVMortg  6  52.977***[0.000]  47.244***[0.000]  Y  1  8.80[0.76]  6.55[0.73]  N 
Unsecured loan 
Overdr  3  8.821[0.753]  7.673[0.587]  N  2  4.24[0.99]  3.69[0.97]  N 
Loan5Y  1  15.0115[0.226]  12.739[0.147]  N  1  4.630[0.988]  3.004[0.991]  N 
Loan10Y  1  17.778[0.106]  15.106[0.066]*  N  1  5.358[0.973]  4.370[0.935]  N 
*The maximum lag length was 13 and optimum lag length was determined by the Hannan-Quinn criterion, as suggested by 
Johansen et al (2000). 
 
Before discussing the results of the cointegrating coefficients over the earlier period, we 
test whether equation (2) provides cointegrating vectors and thus (statistically) valid long-run 
coefficients for the entire sample period. The two credit risk spreads Libor-OIS and the spread 
between 3-month Libor and 3-month Repo rate are denoted as LIBOROIS and CrRisk, 
respectively. They are shown in figures A15 and A16 in the appendix. Both spreads are quite 
low and principally flat until the financial crisis. They then rise dramatically and eventually 
flatten out. The Libor-OIS spread, however, remains elevated in comparison to its pre-crisis 
level.
11  
  The results of the cointegration tests are shown in Table A1 in the appendix. All vectors 







                                                 
11 Both spreads are non-stationary over this sample period. Unit root tests as well as Johansen cointegration tests 
between the two rates (Libor-OIS and Libor-Repo, respectively), confirm non-stationarity of the spreads. Again, 
results can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
12 Excluded are unsecured loans and Access. Figures A12 to A12b show the behaviour of the overdraft and the 
policy rates over time. Even an ‘eyeball’ inspection suggests that both rates are not related to each, neither in the 
earlier nor the later period. Graphs for the remaining unsecured loan rates look similar.  
Table 3: Estimated cointegrating vectors
 
  Jan 1997 – July 2007 
Interest rate  Pass 
through 
Mark-up 
  1  2 




























































Table 3: Estimated cointegrating vectors. Values in () below the coefficients are t
and ‘*’ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. On the basis of the cointegration tests in 
Table 3, the risk spread was not included in the vector
CrRisk is calculated as (LIBOR-Repo)x10. LIBOROIS is defined as the spread between 3
month OIS multiplied by 10. 
 ¹The long-run coefficient on policy rate was restricted to one. For
rejected with   and a probability level of 0.509. For the pre
rejected with  . 
² Data on OIS was only available from July 2000.
 
Table 3 is constructed in three column blocks: the first shows the estimated cointegrating 
coefficients of the earlier period (January 1997 to July 2007), based on equation (1). The 
second and third column blocks cover the whole period and depict the estim
coefficients of equation (2). The second column block includes the Libor
as CrRisk and the third column block shows the estimated coefficients with the Libor
spread.  
Table 3: Estimated cointegrating vectors 
  Jan 1997 – July 2010  July 2000 – July 2010²
Pass 
through 
CrRisk  Mark-up  Pass 
through 
LIBOROIS
3  4  5  6 
Money market rates 
1.019*** 
(68.9) 








































































































































vectors. Values in () below the coefficients are t-statistics. As before, ‘***’, ‘**’ 
and ‘*’ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. On the basis of the cointegration tests in 
Table 3, the risk spread was not included in the vector for SONIA, one-week Libor and the government bond rate. 
Repo)x10. LIBOROIS is defined as the spread between 3-
run coefficient on policy rate was restricted to one. For the longer period, the null hypothesis was not 
and a probability level of 0.509. For the pre-crisis period, the null was clearly 
² Data on OIS was only available from July 2000.  
Table 3 is constructed in three column blocks: the first shows the estimated cointegrating 
coefficients of the earlier period (January 1997 to July 2007), based on equation (1). The 
second and third column blocks cover the whole period and depict the estim
coefficients of equation (2). The second column block includes the Libor-Repo spread denoted 
as CrRisk and the third column block shows the estimated coefficients with the Libor
11 
July 2010² 
LIBOROIS  Mark-up 
7  8 
NA  NA 


















































statistics. As before, ‘***’, ‘**’ 
and ‘*’ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. On the basis of the cointegration tests in 
week Libor and the government bond rate. 
-month LIBOR and 3-
the longer period, the null hypothesis was not 
crisis period, the null was clearly 
Table 3 is constructed in three column blocks: the first shows the estimated cointegrating 
coefficients of the earlier period (January 1997 to July 2007), based on equation (1). The 
second and third column blocks cover the whole period and depict the estimated cointegrating 
Repo spread denoted 
as CrRisk and the third column block shows the estimated coefficients with the Libor-OIS 12 
 
First, we turn to the discussion of the results of the pre-crisis period (cols. 1 and 2). 
Overall, we find that market rates follow the policy rate (with the exception of the corporate 
bond rate). In particular, money market rates show a complete long-run pass-through with 
coefficients all close to one (col. 1).
13  Money market rates also do not show any mark-up over 
the policy rate during the earlier period. Generally, for the other market rates, the pass-through 
is not complete. For those rates, the size of the pass-through coefficient varies from zero (for 
corporate bonds) to one (for some of the mortgage rates). All these rates have a positive mark-
up over the policy rate (col. 2) with the mark up showing some relationship to risk and/or term. 
The exception is the rate on time deposits which shows a negative mark-up. For large, long-
term, time deposits this might be a bit surprising but for ‘retail’ time deposits is probably what 
we would expect. The data does not allow us to disaggregate the series. Furthermore, there is 
not enough evidence to distinguish whether there is a difference in the size of the pass-through 
coefficients and/or the size of the mark-ups of the deposit and (secured) loan rates. If monetary 
policy were to affect deposit rates less than loan rates, when for instance, raising the policy rate 
to reduce demand for credit, then the effect of central bank policy would be greater since the 
spread between loan and deposit rates would become wider. The pre-crisis results, however, do 
not suggest such an effect.   
Turning to the period as a whole, including the crisis (cols. 3 to 8), we find that the 
divergence between the Libor and OIS and Repo rates affected the extent to which banks fixed 
interest rates. Coefficients are high and significant and indicate that a one percentage increase 
in the risk spread is incorporated in the same proportion in the money market rates. Mostly, for 
the same market rate, the two spread coefficients are of quite similar size and this shows some 
robustness of the results.
14 Furthermore, during the later period, the association between policy 
rate and money market rates has not changed compared to the earlier period. There is some 
change with respect to deposit rates and yields, but, the change is highest for secured loans.
15 
The long-run pass-through of secured loans is between 30% and 60% greater before the crisis 
compared to the entire period. This shows a significant fall in long-run responsiveness of loan 
rates to reductions in the policy rate over the later period (bearing in mind that there were no 
policy rate rises in the later period). Furthermore, the mark-up over the policy rate has on 
average risen for all rates, during the crisis – long-term money market rates (6-month and 1-
year Libor) show a significant positive mark-up, deposit rates show a moderate increase in the 
mark-up while for secured loan rates the mark-ups rose over the entire period by about 60% 
compared to the pre-crisis period. Furthermore, the mark-up over the policy rate has on average 
risen for all rates, during the crisis – long-term money market rates (6-month and 1-year Libor) 
show a significant positive mark-up, deposit rates show a moderate increase in the mark-up 
while for secured loan rates the mark-ups rose over the entire period by about 60% compared 
to the pre-crisis period. This is consistent with the findings of Button, Pezzini and Rossietr 
(2010, pp.178-9). In their decomposition of lending rates to households they found the 
                                                 
13 Restrictions of the coefficient to one are not rejected by chi-square test. 
14 For example, the coefficient on CrRisk and Libor-OIS spread is 0.313 and 0.314 for household bonds, 
respectively. 
15 For instance, for 6-month Libor, the pass-through coefficient is 1.029 in the pre-crisis period, 1.000 in the entire 
period when CrRisk measures counterparty risk and 1.012 when the Libor-OIS spread is used. All coefficients are 
not different from 1. However, for instance, the pre-crisis pass-through coefficient on 3-year mortgage rates is 
0.64 and for the entire period, 0.34 (0.31) for the vectors of with CrRisk and LIBOROIS.  13 
 
‘residual’ element of the loan rate (after allowing for risk and funding cost) became sharply 
positive after 2008(3). One explanation for this outcome may be that Libor, on which retail 
interest rates are based, has a significant mark-up over the 6-month and 1-year term when 
estimated for the entire sample period (compared to no mark-up in the pre-crisis period). While 
the fall in policy rate since the crisis reduced deposit rates (the pass-though coefficient has not 
changed and the mark-up has fallen), the reduction in the policy rate pass-through and the 
simultaneous rise in the mark-up for secured loans since August 2007, increased loan rates 
relatively more than deposit rates (compared to the pre-crisis period). This has been the subject 
of much popular comment (and is consistent with our earlier remarks relating to Figure 1).  
This also suggests that banks have tried to mitigate the losses incurred during the crisis 
somewhat by increasing their spreads over deposits and increasing their profitability, a point 
which is made by Button, Pezzini and Rossiter (2010, p.181).. Furthermore, since the aim of 
monetary policy was to stimulate economic activity, some of the effect of the fall in the policy 
rate may have been undermined by the widening in the loan-deposit spread.   
We turn now to the issue of risk over the whole period (cols. 4 and 7). The effect of 
counterparty risk in the later period in raising interest rates in general is obvious from both 
columns. Interestingly, an exception is time deposits where the rise in counterparty risk reduces 
rates paid on deposits. Compared to the results of the money market, where CD rates increased 
with counterparty risk, this may look strange. While banks found it difficult to receive funds on 
the Libor market, they competed for funds in the CD market so that CD rates followed Libor, 
where (as our results show) the latter rose in tandem with counterparty risk. Long-term deposit 
rates are administered by banks and the fall in household deposit rates in response to increased 
counterparty risk may be another channel through which banks tried to make up for their 
incurred losses.  Another interesting result is that a unit increase in the rate for counterparty 
risk in money markets raises mortgage rates by three times as much. This cannot be because 
banks are taking a straightforward opportunity to increase margins in order to repair profits and 
balance sheets, since this effect is captured in shifts of the intercept. We are here looking at 
increases in mortgage rates resulting from the increased counterparty risk identified in money 
markets. One possible interpretation is provided by Drehman, Sorensen and Stringa (2008) 
who point out that counterparty (or credit) risk and interest risk are not independent of one 
another since the risk that interest rates may rise contributes to the risk that borrowers may 
default. Given that the money market spreads are a measure of counterparty (or credit) risk in 
money markets, a one point increase in the spread suggests that banks have become more 
nervous about lending to each other through, say, the interbank market. But suppose that banks 
take a change in that spread as a proxy for a change in credit/counterparty risk more widely. 
They might do this because other sources of information are scarce or expensive. Or they might 
do it because money markets indicators of risk lead all others.( A rise in money market spreads 
occurs before bank borrowers begin to default). Then, a widening of money market spreads is a 
signal that credit risk generally is on the increase. But, as Drehman et al (2008) point out 
credit/counterparty risk is not independent of interest rate risk. This is because a rise in interest 
rates causes an increase in the default rate and vice versa. Now, in short-term money markets, 
interest rate risk is minimal (virtually zero) because existing contracts are liquidated before the 
interest rate change can have much effect (assets and liabilities can be repriced very quickly). 
But now consider a bank with a stack of mortgages. It knows that household gearing in 2008+  14 
 
is still quite high. It also knows that many households are managing to service mortgages only 
because interest rates are generally very low.  Because interest rates are very low, the 
expectation is that future interest rates will rise. Unlike banks in the money market, households 
cannot protect themselves against this and many will default. In these circumstances an 
increase in counterparty risk is enhanced (‘multiplied’) by the substantial interest rate risk. 
The results of the dynamic equation (3) are shown in Table 4 below. The error 
correction terms are significant with no distinctive pattern for categories of interest rates. 
Instantaneous short-run adjustment in response to changes in the policy rate is complete for all 
money market rates. Bank rates and yields have instantaneous short-run adjustments well 
below one and there is no distinctive pattern between adjustments concerning loan or deposit 
rates. The model was estimated distinguishing between adjustment during normal and later 
period. There was no significant difference and therefore the results are not reported.  
 
Dynamic equation  Equilibrium error  Pass-through        AR(12)     1   ARCH(1) 
Money market rates 
dSONIA  -0.335***[0.000]  0.998***[0.000]  0.81  8.284[0.763]  3.322[0.190]  0.009[0.925] 


































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: The second column shows the estimated coefficient with the probability level in [], the column denoted with ‘pass-
through’ depicts the estimated coefficient on instantaneous pass-through with the probability level, AR(12) is the Ljung-Box 
Q-statistic of order 12 with its probability level,    1 is the result of the Jarque-Bera normality test and ARCH(1) is the 




VI Conclusions  
 
The last eighteen months have seen dramatic upheavals in the financial system, with many 
‘conventional’ relationships swept away.  This is particularly true for interest rates to the point 
where the effectiveness of the principal policy instrument has been called into question. Setting 
aside the problem of the zero lower bound (to which the solution may or may not be 
quantitative easing) the widely held view is that the policy rate is less able to influence market 
rates than it has been in more normal times. In particular, it is often stated that there is a 
breakdown between the policy rate and 3-month Libor in particular which is especially 
problematic since 3-m Libor forms the basis for the pricing of a wide range of financial claims.  
  Using monthly data for a wide range of interest rates from January 1997 until July 
2010, we estimated two models. The first was a two-dimensional vector error correction model 
for market and the policy rate for the period before the crisis. The second was an augmented 
model for the period since August 2007, including measures of counterparty risk as suggested 
by the recent literature on risk decomposition to account for the changed risk environment 
since the crisis.  
  What our results show is that the latter assertion is incorrect while the more general 
claim that the policy-market rate relationship has been disrupted needs very careful 
qualification. 
  Firstly, as regards the policy rate and money market rates (including Libor) we find that 
the pass-through is largely unchanged by the crisis. Mark-ups have increased (which triggers 
the zero lower bound problem at higher market rates than before) but the responsiveness of 
money market rates to policy rate is unchanged. 
  Secondly, when we look beyond money market rates, the picture is more complex. For 
secured loans there is evidence that the mark-up has risen while at the same time the policy 
pass-through has fallen since August 2007. The same applies to deposit rates, albeit to a lesser 16 
 
extent. This introduces a degree of asymmetry into the operation of monetary policy since it 
means that a reduction in policy rate (for example) widens the loan-deposit spread, with the 
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Figure A1: spread between SONIA and the policy rate            Figure A1a: Sonia and policy rate 
 
 
Figure A2: Spread between 3-month LIBOR and the policy  Figure A2a: Policy rate , 3-month CD and 3-month LIBOR  
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Figure A3: spread between 1-year LIBOR and the policy rate   Figure A3a: Policy rate and 1-year LIBOR          
 




Figure A5: Spread between hshold time deposit and the                 Figure A5a: Policy and hshold time deposit rate 
policy rate                                                                          
 
 
Figure A6: Spread between hshold bond yield and the                           Figure A6a: Policy rate and hshold bond yield 



















































































Figure A7: Spread between gov. bond yield and the                           Figure A7a: Policy rate and gov. bond yield 
policy rate 
 





































































































Figure A11: Spread between standard variable mortgage rate            Figure A11a: Policy rate and standard variable mortgage rate 
policy rate                                                                             
 





Figure A12b: Household overdraft and the policy rate (normalized) 
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Figure A15: Spread between 3-month LIBOR and 3-month          Figure A16: Spread between 3-month LIBOR and 3-month OIS  
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  lag  Trace  Max eigenv  CV  lag  Trace  Max eigenv  CV         
Money market rates 








Y         










Y         










Y         








Y         
  Deposit rates         








Y         








Y         








Y         
  Yields         










Y         
Secured loan         







































97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
SPREADLOAN10K22 
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Table A1:Values in [] below the test statistics are probability levels. As before, ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, or lower, respectively. 
 
 
 
 